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Introduction
Prices  for most  categories  of natural gas  are currently scheduled  for
deregulation under the  Natural  Gas Policy Act (t'tGRA)  between  1985  and
1987. Approximately  60  percent  of all  gas  will  be  deregulated  in  1985
under the  current plan,  and the  share of gas  that is regulated  will
steadily  diminish. Even  if  gas  is not decontrolled  prior to 1985 through
expl  icit  Congressional  action,  therefore, gas prices  are Iikely to be
deregulated  sometime  this decade  unless  controls  are  extended.  Given tne
support of  the  Reagan  Administration  for more  rapid  decontrol  plans  to
replace  NGPA,  it  is not Iikely that recontrol  plans  will  be  passed.
In spite  of  the  high  probabil  ity  of  decontrol  ,  there  has been
surprisingly I  ittle  investigation into  the  possible structure  of the
natural  gas  market  in the absence  of federal  price  controls.  In  nearly
all  studies of  natural  gas deregulation,  the current  NGPA  scenario  is
compared  to a "free market"  case.f/  The assumption  invariably used is
that  the  elimination  of price controls  embodied  jn NGPA  will  result in a
market  structure  that is relatively free (with the exception  of  severance
taxes)  from  interference  by policymakers.
This  assumption  may be  very  inaccurate.  Given that deliverable
supplies  currently  exceed  demand,  the situation  may  be  more  rem.iniscent  of
the  oil market  prior to 7972  -- a period  in which  production  curtailmentsPage  2
by the Texas  Railroad  Commission  effectively  establ  ished the  price  of
crude oil  for the U.S. Over  80 percent  of marketed  production  of gas  and
63  percent  of domestic  proven  reserves  are located jn  Louisiana, Texas,
Oklahona,  and  New  Mexico. Texas,  in particular, had  25.6  percent  of total
proven  domestic  reserves  of  natural  gas  at  the  end of  lgt;''.U  The
potential  exists,  therefore, for similar market  interference  from  state
regulatory  agencies  which,  rather  than  competition  alone, would set  tne
price of gas  in the  market.
The probability  of  such interference  is fairly  high.  If  decontrol
results in any  perceived  inequities  between  gas producers  (for  example,
integrated  pipeline  conpanies  only  buying  fron producers  owned  by the same
parent  company),  there  wilI  be  calls from  those  denied  access  to  markers
vja  pipel  ines for  renewed  prorationing by  the  state.  The  0klahoma
Corporation  Commission  (OCC),  it  should be  noted,  exercised  its
prorationing  power in  1983 to  compensate  for  a  rnajor surplus of
deliverable  gas  in the state.
If  a state chooses  to  use prorationing, ostensibly to  ensure the
access  of  all  gas producers  to  markets (at least all  those  that can
profitably produce  at the  market  price), the goals  of the regulatory body
become  very  important. Although  agencies,  such  as the TRC  or OCC,  cannot
by 1aw  set prices,  any  decision  to prorate  at less than  100  percent  of the
allowable  level results in higher  than  "free rnarket"  prices.
The purpose  of this paper  is to explore  the consequences  of a set of
alternative  goals  that a state regulatory  agency  might  pursue  in setting  a
prorationing strategy.  The results indicate  that assumptjons  about  thePage  3
objectives  of the agency  have  important  effects on  the ultimate depletion
path of  natural  gas  and  on  the distribution and  ievel of profits across
states.  The  results  also indicate that  the  ability  of  9as producing
states to  coordinate  policies  directly affects the  magnitude  of prices,
producti  on, and  profits,
The  rationale  behind state  regulation of  production  is  presented
briefly  in  Section II.  A  general analytical rnodel  of  the optimal
depletion  policies facing  a regulatory body under alternative sets  of
obiectives is  then  developed  in Section  III.  After deriving  the optimal
po1  icies for a single  state agency,  the gains  from  pursuing  a  coordinated
strategy to  producing  states  (as  well as the forces  working  against  its
stability) are  explored  in Section  IV.  Finally, the impl  ications of  the
results  are  briefly discussed  in Sectjon  V.
II.  The  Rationale  for State  Control  of Exhaustjble  Resource  Depletion
State  governments  have been endowed  with the right to control the
depietion  rates  of exhaustible  resources  located  within their borders. In
the  case of  oil  and  natural  gas,  several  reasons  are general  ly cited in
support  of this authority.  Two  reasons  in particular  are used to  defend
the  need for  state  regulation:  conservation  and the  protection  of
property  rights, and  the stabilization of markets.
The  need  for conservation  in the case  of oil  and  gas  can be  seen in
the development  of the authority  of the Texas  Railroad  Commission  (fnC),.U
0il  and  gas  are  often found  in reservoirs  that have  many  leases  associated
with the formation. Furthermore,  the oil  or gas  flows  freely across  leasePage  4
boundaries  jn reaction to  changes  in  pressure  throughout  the  fjeld.
Because  it  is  not  possible to  assign property  rights to the various
leaseholders  for a resource  that is  continuously  shifting  its  position
relative  to  the surface,  the problem  can  be  considered  an  example  of the
"problem  of the commons"  (Hardin  1968). As  long  as production  quotas are
based  on  the "rule of capture,"  each  owner  has  the incentive  to produce  as
rapidly  as possible  in order  to obtain  a  larger  share of  the  possible
production.  As  a  result,  the  depletion of  the  reservoir occurs
i  neffi c  i  entl  y.
Two  major  sources  of inefficiency  created  by rap.id depletion can be
identified.  First,  oil  and gas  are  most  easily brought  to the surface
through  the use  of the natura'l  pressure  within the reservoir,  often causeo
by  either  natural  gas  or water.  If  the reserve  is depleted  too rapidly,
the geological  forrnation  breaks  down  prematurely,  leading  to  a  reduction
in the potential  recovery  of oil  or gas  from  a given  reserve. Second,  the
incentive  to produce  as rapidly  as possible  Ieads  to excessive  drilling  of
welIs  as  producers  attempt to beat  their competitors  to produce  oil  or
gas. As  a result, costs  of production  are higher  than  they  would  be with
optimal  dri  l ling activity.
These synptoms  of  the "problem  of the comnons"  were  demonstrated  in
1930.3  The  discovery  of a major  reservoir  in East  Texas  coupled  with  the
lack  of a strong  regulatory  body  1ed  to excessive  drilling  and  production,
Between  0ctober  1930  and  the end  of 1933,  over  12,000  wel  1s  were drilled
in  the  East Texas field.  Prices  for East  Texas  crude,  wh.ich  had  been
$1.10/barrel  in 1930,  dropped  to as low  as 90.10  by the end  of  1931.  ToPage  5
stabilize  production  and prices, the Governor  sent  troops  to occupy  the
field.  In response  to this actjon, the TRC  was  granted  the  authority  to
proration wells  in  each field  and to  determine  the minimum  spacing
required  between  wells to control  excessive  dri1ling,
The  conservation  function of the state regulatory  body is  currently
accomplished  in  Texas by  the  establishment  of the "maximum  allowable,,
production  for  each well.  This  maximun  allowable is  determined  by
geologists as  the  maximum  rate  of  extraction  that could  be  conducted
without breaking  down  the  formation  prematurely.  Production from  all
wells  for  the field are then  restricted  by that level  , so  all  owners  are
given  equal  rights and  I  imitations  on  extraction.
In addition  to preventing  waste  and  protecting  the rights  of  owners,
however,  regulation has  been  used  to "stabilize disorderly  markets." 1n
the 1930's,  the TRC,  to protect  the  owners  from cutthroat competjtion,
instituted  "pr"orat'ioning."  Prorationing, along  with wei  I spacing  rules
(which  Iimit the number  of wells that can  be  drilled on  a  given lease),
I  imits  production  from a  particular  field  by  setting  the  maxinum
production  as a percentage  of the maximum  allowable.  In  doing so,  the
state intenvenes  in the market  to limit the supply  of o.il or gas  available
for sale.
It  js this latter motjvation  for the imposition  of  state  regulations
that  is  the  most  controversial. Although  states  are not allowed  to set
prices  by 1aw,  the process  of prorationing  can  result in  de  facto  price
regulation.  As  shown  in  Charts  l  and  2, oil  prices  remained  virtual1y
constant  as long  as the TRC  maintained  prorat.ioning  at less than  100Paqe  6
CHART  1
THE  PENCENT  OF  THE  MAXIMUM  EFFICIENT  RATE  OF  PRODUCTION
ALLOWED  BY  THE  TEXAS  BAILROAD  COMMISSION
PERCENT
SOURCE:  Texas  Railroad  Commission.
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percent. It  is not a coincidence  that 0PEC  was  able  to double prices  in
the  year  that the TRC  began  setting  allowables  at 100  percent.
Natural gas prorationing at  less  than  100  percent  of the  maximum
allowable  is quite possible  subsequent  to price decontrol  .  As mentioned
earl  ier,  arguments can be  raised that  many  producers,  especial  ly
independents,  may  not be  guaranteed  access  to  markets  unless pipeline
companies  are forced  to take  gas  from  all  fields.  In order  to accomplish
this, it  may  be  necessary  to  use prorationjng.  Furthermore,  from the
perspective  of both owners  and  state tax revenues,  there are incentives  to
use  the power  of prorationing  to maximize  the value  of the  gas reserves.
From  the  perspective  of  end-users,  on  the other  hand,  the goal  of the
state  may  be  defined  differently to be  that of cost  minimizers,  or  price
stabil  izers.  As  shown  in  the  next  section,  each  of these  objectives
impl  ies very  different policies toward  the use  of prorationing.
III.  Optimal  Pror"ationing  Policies  for a State  Regulatory  Agency
In order  to characterize  the  optimal prorationing poi  icies  of  an
agency  operating  in the interests  of a state agency,  it  is first  necessary
to specify  the goals  of that  agency  (i.e.,  its  objective functional  ).
Several objectives could be  considered  plausible  in the case  of natural
gas  depletion. For  the purpose  of this analysis, only  three  objectives
FI
will  be  considered.:1/  First, the goal  of maximizing  the present  value  of
rents  from  the reserve  will  be  used.  In  additjon to  representing  the
objective of  a  state  interested in  the well-being  of its  natural  gas
industry,  it  is equivalent  to the goal  of maximizing  the present  value ofpage  B
natural  gas  production  taxes  in the case  of a state that assesses  taxes  on
the basis  of the sale price at the  wel1  head.
Second,  the objective  of maximizing  the present value of  consumer's
surplus is  examined.  The  objective  reflects a desire  on  the part of the
state to look  after the needs  of its consumers,  as wel  l as a desire  on its
part  to  prevent the  imposition  of federal regulations  by gas  irnporting
states.
Third, the impl  ications  of maintaining  a  fixed  price  is  exploreo.
This  procedure  wou.ld  be  consistent  with the pol  icy followed  by the TRC  in
the case  of oil  for the period  prior to 1973. Depletion paths aimed  at
avoiding  price f1  uctuations  are often  considered  by legislative leaders.
The  prob'lem of  determinjng  an  optimal depletion path for  an
exhaustible  resource  like natural  gas  has  been  studied  extensively  in  the
I  iterature.  Variants 0f  Hotelling's  (1931) seminal treatment  have
proliferated  since  the early 1970's,  with major  contributions  by  Dasgupta
and Heal (1974), Stiglitz  (1974), and others. The  case  of imperfect
competition  in oil  markets  (especially  related  to the  theory of  cartels
with  a  competitive  fringe)  has been studied extensively by pindyck
(1978a,1978b),  and  provides  a useful  point of departure  for  the  current
analysi  s.
Assuming  that  the reserve  stock  is known  with certainty, the general
problem  can  be  modeled  as the following  system:Page  9
.I
(1)  Maximize.,i[  e-rr(u(q(t)+qa(p,t))dt
q  -0
subject  to:  (2) i(t)  = - q(t)
and  (s) /l1t1at.n1o1 to
where  u(') = the objective  functional  for the dec.isionmaker,
q  = the current production  of the resource  by the state,
qa  = the production  of the resource  by producers outside  of  the




= the di  scount  rate,
= proven,  extractable  reserves  in the state, and
= the output  price of the resource.
In  order  to  simplify  the  problem,  two  additional  restr"ictions  are
placed  on  the problem.  First, extract.ion  costs  are  assumed  to  be  zero.
Although  narginal extract'ion  costs could  be  ernbedded  into the problem,
their inclusion  would  only  compl  icate the solution without changing  the
substance  of  the  argument. Second,  oil  and gas are  assumed  to be
imperfect  substitutes,  and  the price of oil  is assumed  to  be  exogenous,
As  a  result,  it  is possible  to determine  a downward  sloping  demand  for
natural  gas  without  expl  icit  consideration  of the  oi.i  market.  Although
this  assumption  of  no  feedback  from  natural  gas  prices  to oi1 prices  is
rather  strong, OPEC's  pricing  behavjor in  the  past  has  evidenced
relatively  I  ittle  oil  price  responsiveness  to  changes  in natural  gas
prr  ces  .
The objective functional  ,  U('  ),  can be  defined for  the
experiments 
'l 
isted  above  in the following  forms:
th  reePage  10
(4)  U(')  = P(o(t)+c /+\\  ^/+\ .\r+-,  la \  !,/  ,/ Y\u.,'
2'1
(5)  u(')  =/  D(q)dq,  ana
JO
(6)  P  = c
where  D(q)  is the demand  for the output,  q* is the output  at time  t,  and  c
is a constant. Equation  4 corresponds  to  that  of  a  profit  maximizing
cartel with a competitive  fringe.  Equation  5 relies on  aggregate  consumer
surplus  from  consurnption  of the resource  as a welfare  measure.  The final
form used in  equation  6 establ  ishes  a price rule that allo!.ls  a constant
price increase  over  time. (liote  that if  c = r,  that  the  latter  rule  is
Hotelling's  "r-percent"  rule and  is equivalent  to the soiution  to 5).
Case  1:  The  Profit Maximizer  Objective
Using the  form of U(') given  in equation  4, jt  is possible  to solve
for the optjmal depletion path facing  a  profit  maximizer. Defining
P*(q(t))  as the demand  curve  for the state's production  (total demand  net
of production  by the competitive  frjnge), the  current value Hamiltonian
can  be  wri  tten:
(7)  H  = e-rtlp*(q(t))  q(t)l -r(t)q(t).
Setting the  derivative of  7 with respect  to q equal  to zero  yields the
eq  uat  i  on:
(8) .-ttrqn(t)  =r  (t),
where  MR(t)=[(dP*/dq)q(t)  + P*].  Because  the derivative
to  the  state  variabl  e,  R,  i  s  equal to  zero,  i
Therefore,  differentiating  B  with respect  to time  yields
for prices  in this case:
(9)  MR/MR  = r.
of
the
7 w  ith  re  s  pect
equal  to zero.
optimal pathPage  11
Assuming  that  tax  revenues  are a constant  share  of revenues  received  by
producers,  it  is easily shown  that 9 is an  optimal  path  for  a  government
attempting  to maximize  the present  value  of jts tax ..u.nrar.9/
Case  2:  Maximizing  Consumer  Surplus
By  using the social  welfare  function  defined  above  by 5, the optimal
price path  is equivalent  to Hotel  ling's rule for  a  competitive  economy.
Because  the derivative  of the social  welfare  function  wjth respect  to q is
equa.l  to the price, P, the optima1  rule for this case  can  be  shown  to be:
(io)  PlP  = r,
which  is Hotelling's  rule.
Case  3:  Constant  Pri  ce
To  present  the extreme  case,  let c=0  in equation  6  (i.e. ,  the  state
chooses  to  peg prices  at a constant  level  ).  The  optimal  price path,  by
assumpti  on, is given  by:
(11)  P/P  = 0.
Comparison  of the "Optimal"  Paths
The  optimal  quantity  trajectories implied  by the price paths  'in  9,  10
and 11 are  quite different.  Note  that although  the optimal  policies are
stated  in terms  of prices,  the instrument  used  by the regulatory  body  is a
trajectory  of  quantity  restrictions  over  time  that satisfies the desired
price path.  In order  to determine  the optimal  quantity  path,  as  t'/ell as
the initial  price, it  is necessary  to use  the resource  constraint  equation
in 3.Paqe  12
The  three  alternative  policies are compared  in  Chart 3.  The first
quadrant  maps  the  price  paths over  time,  with  the net demand  curve
d'i  splayed  in the second  quadrant.  The  third quadrant  maps  production  from
the  price/quantity dimens  ion  to  the  quantity/time dimension  shown  in
quadrant  IV.  Th'i  s last quadrant  maps  the aggregate  production  path over
time  for each  specified  price path.
The  optimal  price and  quantity  paths  shown  in the chart  are  determined
usjng  two  equations. First, the slope  of the  price  path  is  determined
from the  optimal path derived above in  9, 10, and  11, respectively.
Second,  the endpoints  (initial  and fjnal  prices)  are  fixed  using the
optimal path  and  the resource  constraint. This  constraint  is represented
graphically  by the area  bounded  by the function  in  quadrant  IV  and the
axes,  and  represents  cumulative  use  over  time.
Gi  ven the  pri  ce  paths, endpoi  nts  are  establ  i  shed by choosi  ng  an
'initial price path  (at t=0), applying  the Euler equation, and comparing
the total stock  used  conditjonal  on  that starting pojnt to the total stock
available.  If  the aggregate  use  over  time  exceeds  (is  less  than)  the
total stock,  the starting price is raised  (lowered)  so that the use  in all
periods  is decreased  (increased).  This  procedure  is  followed until  the
starting pnice  and  the Euler  equation  exactly  exhaust  the resource  stock.
A  comparison  between  the first  two  cases  reveals  the usual  difference
between  depletion  paths  of a competitor  and a  monopol  ist:  Because  the
price  path for a monopo'l  ist'i s slower  (assuming  that the time  derivative
of the slope  of the demand  curve  is greater  than  or equal to  zero),  the










































































































but  the  price  increase is  slower  and  results in greater  production  in
later  peri  ods  .-/
The  last case,  however,  cannot  be  uniquely  determined. Because  that
case is  not  based  on  a pl"esent  value  calculation,  there  is no  criterion
with which  to rank  the various  price paths,  If  it  is  assumed  that  the
pol  icy  should  be  established  such  that the maximum  value  (in undiscounted
terms)  should  be extracted, or  equivalently in  this  case, that  tne
production  should be  shared  by  all  future generatjons,  then  the price
should  be  set at the maximum  price at which  there  is  still  some  demand.
In  that  case, an  infinitely  smalI  production  level would  be  regulated
forever.
0n  the other  hand,  if  the goal  were to  maximize  production in  the
short  run,  the  state  could set prices (again  net of extraction  costs)
close  to zero.  Production  would  then  occur  at the maximum  level for which
there was sufficient  demand  until the resource  was  completely  depleted,
after which  zero  production  would  occur.  In this  case, producers  would
have  every  incentive  to produce  as quickly  as possible  because  the present
value  of reserves  in the ground  would  be  decl  ining  over  tine.  This  latter
rule could  be  optimal  for a state government  if  it  desired  to maximize  the
present  value  of tax revenues  from  the resource  and  used  a  fixed  tax  on
each  unit (as  opposed  to the unit's value).
IV.  Gains  to Col  lective Prorationing
In  the  first  case examined  above, the  revenue  maximization
implied  that gains  could  be  obtained  from  using  the  monopoly  power
case
thatPage  15
the  state  possessed  through control  of  a  significant share  of tota'l
production. In this section, the  benefits from expanding  that  power
through  the coordination  of prorationing  by regulatory  bodies  in the major
producing  states  are  examjned.
The  gains  to  coordinating  pol  icies  (i.e.,  basing decisions  about
prorationinq levels  in  a co'l  lective agreement)  can  be  seen  by expanding
equation  4 to include  other  producing  states explicitly,  Redefine  U(')
bv:
(12) u(q(t))  = r(q(t)+qu(t)+qo(t))q(t),
where  q. is the production  by  a producer  outsjde  of the "cartel" and  qO  is
the production  from  another  state that chooses  to coordinate  prorationing
po1  icies.  The optimal price  path  equation  that would  result from  this
formulation  of the objective  functjonal  is unchanged  from  that in  9,  but
the  path  itself  would  be  shifted.  The  optimal  price path  still  satisfies
the condition  that marginal  revenue  grows  at the rate of discount,  but the
marginal  revenue  function  is changed.
To  see  this, marginal  revenue  corresponding  to 12  can  be  written:
(13) MR(t)  = P  + q(t)[(aPlaq\  + (2P/aq)@q^/aq1  + (aP/aci@cr/ao)).
In  the previous  section, it  was  assumed  that aqa/Aq  and  0qr/0q were  equal
to zero, implying that  there would be  no  output response  of  other
producers  to  a change  in the state's production  level except  in response
to changes  in price. In this case,  while  lqa/Aq  is  still  assuned  to  be
zero  (except  insofar  as prices  change)  , |qn/aC  is assumed  to be  positive:
a reduction  in the other member's  production  would be  accompanied  by  a
reduction in  the  production  of  b's  output because  of  the  assumeo
coordination  of prorationing  p1  ans.Page  16
Given  positive  0q,o/Aq,  the slope  of the marginal  revenue  funct.ion  is
greater than before.  Because  the  joint decisions  increase  the marker
power  of the joint  regulators,  monopoly  profit potential  is increased.  As
a  result,  the  abil  ity  of  producing  states  to coordinate  prorationing
pol  icies would  lead  to  a  higher price  (and therefore greater supply
restriction)  initially,  followed by a slower  growth  rate in prices  than
that experienced  in the cases  descrjbed  in Section  III.
The  forces  working  against  cartelization, however,  can  also  be  seen  in
equation  13.  Increases  in  market power  are  obta.ined  through the
assumption  that a reduction  in q will  be  matched  at least partially  by  a
reduction in  qb,  This  feature  of the solution  implies  that some  of the
decisjonmaking  power  of the  regulators is  lost.  Furthermore,  if  one
producing state  can  renege  on  its  agreement  without the  others
retal  iating, that state stands  to benefit  even  more:  as  long  as  other
states  restrict  supply to  some  degnee,  states  that  do  not restrjct
production  benefit  from  the price effect without  sacrificjng output.
Implications
The  results  of the simple  model  presented  above  cast some  doubt  on  tne
degree to  which the  natural gas  narket can  be expected  to be free from
regulations  after price deregulation.  As  shown  in Section III,  only  if
regulators adopt an  objective  functional  that maximizes  consumer  surDlus
is the optimal  production  path  allowed  by the regulator  equivalent  to that
generated  by a free market. If  the state is instead  interested  in either
preventing  prices  from  changing  (or pegg.ing  them  to a price outside  of thePage  17
natural  gas  market)  or in maximizing  revenues,  the optirnal  po1  icy for the
state requires  intervention  to restrict production.
Indeed,  from  the perspective  of maximizing  tax revenues  or  promoting
the  health of  its  natural  gas  industry,  regulatory  agencies  such  as the
TRC  are encouraged  to restrict  production. To the  extent  that  producer
state  agencies  are  able  to  collude in  prorationing  regulations,  the
ability  of the agency  to real  ize monopoly  profits is increased.
Two  considerations,  however,  affect the ability  of the TRC  or  OCC  to
control  the  price  of natura'l  gas  through  quantity  restrictions.  First,
the constitutionality  of  explicit  prorationing collusion by  producing
states could be  questioned.  Even  if  such  collusion  urere  not found  to be
unconstitutional,  there  would  be  considerable  pressure  by  non-producing
states  to  eljminate  the agreements,  possibly  by threatening  to return  to
federal  price regulations.
Second,  although  Texas  and  Oklahoma  currently  possess  a large  share  of
totaj  proven reserves, the  major new discoveries of natural  gas  are
occurning  in other  states  (such as  California and Alaska) where the
tradition  of  prorationing is less  establ  ished. Therefore,  while  in the
short run the TRC  and  OCC  may  be  able  to  act  as  the  cartel  ,  further
relative  gains in  productive  capacity  in other  areas  of the country  may
either dilute thejr market  power,  or yield a new  cartel  .  As  a result, the
development  of  regulatory  structures and  mandates  in these  other states
should  be  of increasing  importance  in the long  run.l.  Examples  of this implicit assumption  can  be  found  in most studies of
the  potential  effect of natural  gas  deregulation.  For  examples,  see
U.S.  Department  of Energy  (August  l9B1)  and ltiuzzo  (1982).  Although
studies  often include  continued  regulation  after 1985,  they  inevitably
n'rodel  continued  price regulation  at the federal  level  .
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Footnotes
Source: Wor'ld 0il,  February  15, 1983,  p. 144.
+.
2.
? For  an  excellent  analysis  of the forces  shaping  the development  of the
Texas Railroad Conrmission  and  its  subseouent  actions  toward  oil  and
gas  prorationing,  see  Prindle  (1981),
See  Chapter  2 of Prindle  (1981) for  a  descript.ion  of  the  events
l  eadi  ng  to these  actions.
0ther  goals can also  be  considered. For  example,  Prindle  (1981)
details a conflict between  the interests  of independent  and  integrated
producers.  Concerns  about future  generations may  also affect the
characterization  of the ob.jective  functional  if  the discount rate  is
deemed  insufficient.  Furthermore,  the  spil lover  effects  of  gas
exploration  and  development  on  the environment  may  play  a larger  role
under  certa  i  n assumptions.
This  equivalence  holds as long  as the tax rate is assessed  on  value
and  is invariant  with respect  to time.  To  demonstrate  this,  equation
7  can  be altered to represent  tax revenues  by nrultiplying the term in
brackets  by  T (the tax rate).  Differentiatiirg the  iew- Hamiltonian
with  respect  to q yields the same  expression  found  in 8 mu1  tipl ied  by
T,  Because  T is a constant,  it  drops  out of equation  9, resulting  in
the same  growth  rule shown  in 9.
This  result  was first  established  by  Hotelling (1931).  After
rearranging  tenms,  equation  9 can  be  written in the form:
i = " * fr(aplaq)q  - (apiaq)q  - (aplaq)61
P'-
The  relative speed  of the competitive  and  monopoly  price paths depend
on  the  sign  of the term  in brackets. The  first  term  is negative  as
long  as the demand  curve  slopes  downward.  The final  term is  also
negative as  long  as quantity  supplied  falIs over  time  and  the demand
curve  slopes  downward.  The  middle  term,  however,  could  be  positive  or
negative. As  long  as d(dpldq)/dt  is nonnegative  (or outweighed  by the
other  terms), nonopoly  prices  increase  at  a  slower rate  than
conpetitive prices.  If  the slope  of the demand  curve  is stationary
over  time, thjs conditjon  is satisfied.Page  19
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